Nevertheless, the hypothesis is incomplete in an important sense: while Bhaduri uses the undervaluation of collateral in a significant way, he does not provide any formal explanation of why collateral is underpriced, other than a casual mention of it being a consequence of the monopolistic position of the lender. M oreover, an attempt to explain the determination of collateral price within the framework of Bhaduri's model leads to some quite implausible conclusions (see section 4). It is this, and the shortcomings o f the more traditional lender's risk hypothesis (section 2) which motivates the model in this paper (section 5).
The model is developed in two steps. First a 'dual' to Bhaduri's analysis is developed by assuming the interest rate to be fixed and the collateral price to be the only control variable with the lender. This shows that while it is conventional to assume the opposite, there is no a priori reason for that.
The simultaneous determination of collateral price and interest rate is taken up as a second step. This provides an endogenous explanation of the underpricing of collateral (that is, the existence of implicit interest rates). This has the important implication that the absence of high interest rates cannot be equated with the absence of usurious extraction because there could exist implicit charges. T o quote from K urup's (1976) detailed study of usury in Kerala:
... there exists, in this area, a variety of loan transactions which, on the surface, are interest-free but where heavy interest is in fact hidden under the rug... [T] he presence of such implicit charges entirely escapes the net of conventional surveys.
The le n d e r 's risk h yp oth esis and critiq u e
This hypothesis has been discussed in many places (eg. Bottomley, 1975; Raj, 1979) . To recapitulate briefly, assume that, on average, q is the fraction of the loan that is defaulted. If a lender gives a loan of Rs L at interest rate i, his expected earning (assuming that there is no collateral) is (1 + i) ( l -q) L -L. The effective interest, d, is obtained by dividing this by L:
At equilibrium, d is equal to the interest rate in the organised sector, which is assumed to be exogenously given to this market. Hence i depends on q and clearly di/dq> 0. For example, if the organised sector interest rate is 10%, q -0 -5, then i = 120%. Therefore, to sustain an effective interest rate of 10% a nominal rate of 120% is needed. This is the crux of this hypothesis: the high rates observed are illusory.
The lender's risk hypothesis has been effectively criticised on the ground that thanks to the personalised relation in rural usury the borrower typically cannot get away without paying (see Raj, 1979 , for some interesting evidence). If he does not have money, he has to pay in terms of assets or even bondage.
O ut of this criticism emerged the 'default hypothesis' but, before discussing it, let us sketch the institutional and empirical basis of it, particularly because the present model is developed for broadly the same empirical set-up. 3
E vid en ce and th e in stitu tio n a l fram ew ork
The salient feature of the credit market being considered here is isolation. The widespread prevalence of this in backward areas is well documented. Roth (1979) discusses this at length in the context of some village studies in Bihar. Bardhan and Rudra (1978) also show that while professional moneylending no doubt exists, loans are taken by tenants and cultivators predominantly from their employers. In their study, in W est Bengal 51% o f tenants reported taking consumption loans from their landlords. In criticising Bottomley's (1963) lack o f emphasis on the monopolistic elements in rural usury, Chandarvarkar (1965) has cited some unusual evidence on the lack of competition. He refers to a study by the Reserve Bank o f India which showed that among 600 surveyed villages, 64% had no professional moneylender and 11-5% had only one resident moneylender. M oreover, even when moneylenders are involved, there is usually a personalised relation. As Bailey (1964) puts it in his anthropological study o f Orissa:
Like the paddy loans, these small cash advances entail little risk. The sum involved is small: the parties have known one another for a long time .. . In situations such as this, clearly the lender's risk hypothesis is inapplicable.
Both Bhaduri's model and the one developed here pertain to usury relations where loans are given against some form of security. And secured loans are important in rural usury. According to a Reserve Bank of India (1977) survey, 40% o f the loans in 1971 were given against well-defined securities. Atiqur Rahman's (1979) detailed study of credit relations in two regions o f Bangladesh reveal that more than 50% o f the loans were against some security. M oreover, large fractions of these secured loans are against some 'immovable property'. This suggests the importance o f physical proximity between the lender and the borrower. This, coupled with the fact that the collateral is often odd items like a fruit orchard or a standing crop, lends credence to Bhaduri's view that collaterals are frequently unmarketable in the organised money market but can be of value to the village landlord.
The present paper is w ritten with consumption loans in mind (though with some adaptation it may be possible to consider production loans). Consumption loans are a significant component o f credit dealings. For example, 38% and 30% of the loans in Phulpur and in Comilla were taken for consumption purposes (Rahman, 1979) . Tw o additional things have to be kept in mind. These figures would be higher for poorer borrowers, and in general there is a tendency to under-report consumption loans because borrowers find lenders are more amenable to offering loans if they are for production.
T he above features describe the situation where the model should be applied. T here is therefore no attem pt to claim that all rural credit markets are monopolistic and that all loans are secured and are taken for consumption. Instead, our analysis should be thought of as one which applies to markets with these traits, though hopefully the theory will, with greater elaboration over time, help us understand an increasingly wide range of empirical phenomena.
W hat the model is supposed to explain is (i) the underpricing o f collateral, (ii) the existence o f high interest rates, and (iii) the multiplicity of interest rates. All these features are widely prevalent in backward agriculture. For example, in W est Bengal 68% o f casual labourers take loans from their respective employers against the commitment of future labour. And in 80% of these cases the casual labourer works at a lower wage than the market rate at the time of repaym ent (Bardhan and Rudra, 1978) . Similar facts are reported in many other works (see, e.g., K urup, 1976; Sivakumar, 1978) .'
As far as interest rates go, both their enormous heights and diverse range have been widely reported (e.g., Rahman, 1979; Bhaduri, 1973; Griffin, 1974; Bailey, 1964) . What has attracted a lot of attention recently is that in many cases zero interest is charged (see Rahman, 1979:, Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Platteau, M urickan and Delbar, 1981) . There are alternative ways of explaining this: there could be implicit charges, which is the main contention o f this paper, or this could be the consequence of factor market interlinkage (Basu, 1983A) . It should, however, be admitted that the importance of the zero interest cases has been somewhat exaggerated. For example, a closer scrutiny of the data often reveals (see Rahman, 1979 ) that a substantial portion of the zero interest cases are those involving friends and relatives. And clearly such transactions lie beyond the realm of economic analysis, unless of course one believes i.n the economics o f marriage.
T he d e fa u lt h y p o th esis and c ritiq u e
In sharp contrast to the lender's risk hypothesis, in Bhaduri's (1977) model the lender uses the interest rate to encourage default, because he can then confiscate the collateral. This section briefly recapitulates Bhaduri's model or, as it is often referred to, the default hypothesis.
Consider a small peasant or a poor tenant who takes a loan of Rs L against some assets kept as security, i.e. some collateral. Because of his poverty he has a limited capacity to repay the loan. T hus there is a proportion of the loan, U, which he is forced to default. This is supposed to depend on the interest rate, i, charged on the loan. T hus
This is the involuntary default function and it defines a feasible region. For any i the borrower cannot default less than u(i) though he can default more if he so wishes. O f course, he has to compensate for the total default by giving the lender an equivalent amount of the collateral. The price of the collateral used to calculate this equivalent amount is denoted by p and referred to as the conversion price of the collateral or simply as the collateral price. T he asset used as collateral has a market and its market price1 is n. But while the lender because of his superior position has access to this market the borrower does not. This, according to Bhaduri, enables the lender to undervalue the collateral. And hence his funda mental assumption that the collateral price is less than the market price, i.e. p < n .
T he borrow er's personal valuation of a unit of the collateral is tcb. Bhaduri quite realisti cally assumes that this will be very high, and generally,2 n < 7iB.
If 1 + i > n B/p a rupee defaulted is less costly than a rupee repaid, from the borrow er's viewpoint. T hus in this case the borrower will default the entire loan. Similarly, if 3 l + i< 'Actually nothing in our analysis is affected if there is no market. In that case, instead of n we would have to use -the lender's personal valuation of a unit of collateral. Bhaduri in fact uses max {tt, 7ij). While that is correct it may be unnecessary because since the lender has access to the asset market, he will buy the asset if > k and will continue to do so till the values converge. Thus, if a market exists, then in any stable situation we would expect max {rr, -2 Again, this assumption is more a condition of equilibrium than an assumption. If k > kb> the landlord would buy the asset front the poor tenant who has no access to the organised market and sell it on the organised market. Thus normally wc would expect n < n B. Our assumption merely restricts this to a strict inequality.
3Bhaduri uses strict inequality. Our use of weak inequality is conceptually harmless and has the advantage of ensuring the existence of a solution to the maximisation of equation (3) below.
Tig/p, he tries to defa ult as little as possible, given the constraint o f equation (1). Thus, denoting the proportion of the loan actually defaulted by u, we have
Ofiven an interest rate, i, the lender's net earning, D, from this loan is given by1
This could alternati vely be written as
The interest rate, i, in this model, is determined by the lender so as to maximise his earning, D. Many interesting propositions emerge from this model. For instance, the interest will be high and in particular, i> (n/p) -1. But it is never set so high as to go beyond (n B/p) -l y which implies that the entire loan will not be defaulted. Further, and this is where the main distinction between the default hypothesis and the earlier theories lies, in this model there is no lender's risk because the collateral price is set below the market price.
This model has received a great amount of attention-including criticism, reformulation and field studies (see, for example, Rahman, 1979; Ghose, 1980; Rao, 1980; Borooah, 1980; Bhaduri, 1983; Bardhan, 1980) . Despite this, what has received almost no scrutiny is the determination of the collateral price, and-as I argue in a moment-this is probably the most important weakness in Bhaduri's (1977) model. Clearly it is the underpricing of collateral which rules out lender's risk; and it is this same feature which pushes up the explicit interest rate. Hence without a theory o f collateral price formation we cannot have a complete model of rural credit and interest.
To see the difficulty of explaining the collateral price, p, within the confines of the default hypothesis, consider first Bhaduri's own observation:
The personalised character of the unorganised credit market is reflected in the lender's ability to place on securities of his choice an arbitrary valuation, which, needless to say, typically results in their gross undervaluation (1977, p. 344, my 
italics).
Thus Bhaduri clearly regards p as chosen by the lender to aid usury. However, in his algebra he treats p as exogenously given (and less than n). What happens if we rectify this and make p another control variable, like i, in the lender's hand. What value would p take?
Within the context of the above model, if p and i are both treated as the lender's control variables, it is easy to see that the lender will extract an indefinitely large amount of wealth from the borrower. He first has to choose a sufficiently high rate of interest such that the borrower is forced to default, i.e. i is such that u(i)> 0. T hen from (4) it is obvious that the smaller the p, the greater the lender's earning, D. Thus p will be set indefinitely small ■It is assumed here that a default of a part of the loan obliterates the interest charge on it. If this was not the case D would be equal to
(i.e. close to zero) and the borrower will be divested of his entire asset holding. Notice further that this is true no m atter how small the loan is. Thus even for an infinitesimal loan the peasant will lose all his wealth. This is the dilemma of the default hypothesis. Either we treat p as exogenous (it is difficult to see how this could be the case) or else we are led into the above absurdity.
On reflection it is clear that this dilemma follows from one characteristic of the default hypothesis: T he peasant has to take a fixed loan of L from his landlord no m atter what the terms. But clearly this is unrealistic. If the terms are too bad the peasant may well opt to flee or go on an empty stomach.
Actually Bhaduri (1977) himself considered the possibility of the size of the loan depend ing on the terms under which it is offered, i.e.
This case has been discussed at length by Borooah. Does this resolve our dilemma? U nfor tunately, the answer is no. Let the lender choose an i such that L(i) > 0 and w(z) > 0.1 Then once again by setting p indefinitely close to zero, the lender can make D, i.e. his net earning, indefinitely large.
W hat has gone wrong? The answer is simple: while the assumption that L responds to i is a step in the right direction, it is inadequate. W hat is the intuition behind this assump tion? It tries to capture the fact that as the terms of the loan become worse we expect the peasant to try and manage with a smaller loan from the particular lender in question. B ut then a raising of i is not the only way in which the terms of a loan can deteriorate. A lowering of p has the same effect. Thus the same reasoning which makes us believe that L depends on i and L '( i ) < 0 , leads us to expect that L depends on p as well and as p falls, L decreases. To recognise this is the first step towards a theory of collateral price determination.
A th eory o f c o lla te r a l p rice and in terest form ation

The framework
The total loan taken-in accordance with the above argument-is given by
It is possible to impose some natural restrictions on (5), Notice that if « = 0, then the cost of taking a loan does not depend on p and its lowering would thus leave L unchanged. A similar argum ent holds for u = 1 and the raising of i. We may therefore assume that (5) satisfies:
It will also be assumed that there exists a sufficiently small p, say p°, at which the borrower takes a loan which is small enough not to entail any default and that u = 0. N ot only is this assumption realistic, its denial has quite absurd implications. ' In the absence of such an i the default hypothesis is itself trivial.
Apart from these, no other restrictions are imposed on (5). It is, nevertheless, conceptually interesting to examine the factors which lend elasticity to the loan demand function. As z increases or p falls, there would typically be two factors leading to a lowering of L. Firstly, as already argued, the borrower will try and make do with a smaller loan. Secondly, he may turn to other sources like the local shopkeeper or professional moneylender, at terms which earlier were not sufficiently attractive, thereby implying a fall in L (i.e. the loan taken from the landlord). If the isolation of the credit market is complete then this second factor is absent and the loan demand function will be relatively inelastic. (It should, however, be emphasised that because of the existence of the first factor, it is wrong to claim that complete isolation implies complete inelasticity.) On the other hand, if the credit market is perfectly competititve-which is grossly unrealis tic but unfortunately underlies a considerable amount of traditional thinking-then L will be perfectly elastic with respect to i and p at certain given values. T hus the extent of isolation of the credit market is captured by the extent of elasticity of L.
In Bhaduri's original model there was some confusion about the nature of the default function (1). Rao (1980) drew attention to this and later Bhaduri (1983) clarified that (1) represented an involuntary default function determined by the 'more or less constant level of income of the borrow er' and thus 'his ability to repay the debt obligations m ust, in general, decrease with higher interest rates'. But if u is determined by the limited liquidity of the borrower at the time of repaym ent, then clearly it should depend on L as well as z.1 T he larger the L, the larger is the proportion he is forced to default. This becomes clearer if we state formally what Bhaduri, Rao, Borooah and others write about casually: let K be the maximum amount of cash the borrower has at the time of repaym ent of the loan. T he involuntary default function now takes the following specific form: w = 0, if (1 + z) L < K and (1 -u) (1 + z) L~K , if (1 + z) L > K. This may be written as
T he assumption of a given non-stochastic K which is independent of the other variables of the model is a strong assumption. However, this is nothing but the formal statement of what has been informally assumed in the existing literature. I continue to use this assumption here for simplicity and in order not to distract attention from the main purpose of this paper, leaving for section 6.1 a discussion of the alternative interpretations of K and their implications. For the same reasons as in the default hypothesis, the actual proportion of default, u, is given by
'T his is a serious omission in Borooah's (1980) algebra, particularly since in his prose he is quite clear about the role of L. As he quite rightly points out, there could exist situations where landlords would lower the interest in order to encourage larger loans, and hence larger defaults.
The lender's income from usury, D, is composed of interest and transferred collateral:
D = D(i, />) = [?'(1 -u) + (--\ ) u] L.(8
) P
In this generalised framework the lender chooses p and i so as to maximise D subject to (5), (6) and (7). This gives us a theory of the formation of p and i in isolated credit markets and also sheds interesting light on the process of usury.
Note that the two components of D could be thought of as the explicit and implicit interest earnings. Since p is the only variable in ijt/p) -1, a theory of collateral price is, in effect, a theory of implicit interest.
A complete characterisation of the optimal i and p would entail cumbersome mathemat ical maximisation without providing any significant intuition. On the other hand, if we want to establish some economically meaningful properties of the optimal i and p, we can do this by assuming the existence of an optimum and using some simple reasoning.
We shall, however, not do this directly. Instead we first look at a special case of this model. There are two polar special cases of this generalised framework. Firstly, p may be treated as exogenous and this could be thought of as a theory of (explicit) interest determination. Secondly, it may be assumed that i is exogenous and we could have a theory of the determination of collateral price. Bhaduri's model is the first special case. In the next few pages the second special case is developed. The general case is taken up after that.
The dual case
In this section i is treated as fixed. T he lender chooses the collateral price, />, so as to maximise his net income, D (i, p) . Assuming that an optimal p exists,1 let us use p to denote it. The principal aspect of p which interests us is its relation with n. Is there reason to believe that collateral is generally undervalued, he. p < n ? The question is of fundamen tal importance to Bhaduri's work, its subsequent extensions and discussions, and to the analysis of rural interest rates in general. Fortunately, a clear answer is possible: within the framework of this model collateral is necessarily undervalued.
This may be established as follows. From (6) and (7) it is clear that u could be equal to 1 or « and u could in turn be 0 or 1 -K /{ 1 + i)L . Hence the optimum situation could be of three types, depending on whether
'In fact, in many situations, a direct assumption about existence is methodologically no inferior to the more fashionable approach of making cumbersome assumptions and then deducing existence. In this case, however, it so happens that the existence of an optimum p is quite easily assured. It is easy to show that the optimum p, if it exists, cannot lie outside the closed interval \p°, Tig). The main problem arises from the fact that if we define the function Z)(i, ,) on this interval, there will exist a discontinuity at point 7t^/(l + i). This follows from (7), Notice that in reality if p=7ig/(\ + i), i.e. i= (itg/p) -1 then the borrower is indifferent between defaulting and repaying. This means that at this point we could assume either u = I or u(i,L) (though in (7) I have assumed u -u(i,L) ). This means that we could ensure that D(i, .) is upper semi-continuous (as defined for a function as opposed to a correspondence). Hence, since [p°, n$\ is compact, D{i, .) must take on a maximum value somewhere within \p°, Tig) (this is an immediate corollary of theorem 2 in Berge (1963, p. 76). I am grateful to Jean Waelbrock for pointing this out to me
At the optim um , D must be greater than zero, because otherw ise the moneylender would not indulge in usury. H ence ((n /p ) -I ) L > 0 , i.e. p< 7i.
In Case II, by substituting
T h e necessary condition for this to be the optim um is dD/dp = 0: hence,
for the above equation to be tru e, p > n.
Finally, given Case III, (6) implies (1 + i) L < K . This means that the entire loan is repaid in cash. H ence the price of collateral has no operational significance. T his establishes that whenever collateral is transferred it is underpriced. M oreover, the earlier literature was only considering cases where default invariably took place, i.e. Cases I and II, and in both cases p < n. These results continue to hold in the general case as is shown in the next section. But before going to that, it is worthwhile spending a few moments on the implications of the above analysis.
Note that this framework ensures that the price o f collateral will not be indefinitely small. This is intuitively obvious once we appreciate the process of usury. H ere p is the control variable with the lender. The lower he sets this the more he earns per rupee o f defaulted loan. T hus it seems he would prefer to set it arbitrarily low. If, how ever, p is set below p°, the borrow er will ensure that he does not have to default. H ence, by assumption (i), p ceases to have any effect on L. T herefore, no fu rth er advantage can be reaped by setting it even lower.
In his model o f interest determ ination, Bhaduri showed that it always pays the lender to push up the interest rate beyond (7z/p) -1 bu t not past (n B/p) -1. T hus in the optimum situation (a) i> (jt/p) -1 and (b) i< (n B/p ) -1. R esult (a) is, however, lost in Bhaduri's own extension of the simple default hypothesis from the fixed loan assum ption to the case where the loan size depends on the interest rate (see Borooah, 1980) . Result (b), however, remains valid. T hat implies, it is obvious from equation (7), that the borrow er will not default the entire loan, i.e.
1. H ence B haduri's assertion that the lender's earnings comprise two parts: interest earnings and transferred assets.
In our model, (b) need not necessarily hold. T h ere can exist situations where the optimal p is such that i > ( n B/p) -1. This would, of course, lead the borrower to default totally. T hus in certain cases it is possible that the lender's income consists only of transferred assets. T he possibility of the optimal p being sufficiently large such that i > ( n B/p ) -1 (i.e. (b) is violated) is not difficult to establish. If n < n B/ ( \ + z), then from the fact that collateral is always undervalued, we know p* < n B/( 1 + 1), where p* is the optimal price (as before). H ence i< (n B/p*) -1. Thus if n < n B/ ( \ + z), (b) is necessarily satisfied. H ence a violation of (b) is possible only if 7t> nB/( \ +z). Assume that this is in fact the case, i.e. 7 i> n B/ ( l + f ) . Let D° be the maximum the lender could have earned if p is restricted to satisfy (b). Now let the lender raise p to p such that 1 + i > n B/p', but let it not be so high that n/p < 1. At p there is total default and the lender's net earning is In a similar manner it can be shown that, unlike in the default hypothesis, here Case III can arise as well. Thus all possible cases which arise in reality can arise here depending on the parametric configurations. W hat is interesting is that in all cases p lies above a certain level and below n.
T here are other features of this model which are worth examining. For instance, one would expect a relation between the elasticity of loan demand with respect to p and the lender's choice of the collateral price, p*. In general, we would expect p* to be higher the less elastic the demand. This has been observed empirically. Presumably L will be more inelastic the more urgent the demand for cash and more isolated the credit market. Sivakumar's (1978) study of some villages in Tam il Nadu leads him to observe Most of these loans are accompanied by pledging of some amount of land. The amount advanced varies from'. 33 per cent to 70 per cent of the worth of the piece of the land, depending upon the urgency of cash requirements (my italics).
It would be interesting to establish theoretically a relation of this sort.
Many other details are worth looking into but to undertake that here would be somewhat tangential to the purpose of this paper.
The general case
Now consider the actual problem which entails the simultaneous determination of i and p. The lender will choose these so as to maximise D. Let the chosen values be denoted by i* and/>*. A complete characterisation of this optimum is complex and, for our purpose, unnecessary. The fundamental question is again w hether in this generalised framework there is reason to expect the underpricing of collateral, i.e. the existence of positive implicit interest? The answer is yes and it is surprisingly easy to show this.
Since i* a n d p* are optimal, by definition, D(i*, />*) > D(i, />), for all i andp. This implies that D(T, />*)> D(t*, p), for all p. Hence if the interest rate was exogenously fixed at i'*, then/)* is the optimal for the lender. But it was precisely in such a framework, i.e. where i was given exogenously, that the underpricing of collateral was proved in the previous section. Hence p* < n. This is the generalised framework which the earlier writers had in mind, though they ended up modelling a special case of it. The default hypothesis had caused a dilemma: either assume p to be exogenous (which is quite absurd considering that p enters only in this transaction) or its magnitude is indefinitely close to zero. T he theory and the framework developed in this paper resolves this. The exogenous/) in Bhaduri's model was assumed to be below the market price of the asset. It was argued above that this is a widespread feature of rural credit markets in less developed economies. In the present model it is shown analytically that the endogenously determined collateral price will end up below the market place.
This means that the lender's risk is indeed non-existent and one o f the motives in raising i could be to encourage default. In other words, there will usually exist positive implicit interest charges. Hence the interest rate that is observed may not be a reflection of the full cost that the borrower incurs.
It may be useful briefly to sum up the findings of this section. It has been alleged that one way in which implicit charges are imposed in rural usury is by underpricing land or other assets used as collateral while granting loans. The underpricing of collateral has been observed empirically and it also plays a crucial role in a class of theoretical studies of rural usury. Despite this, there has hardly been any effort to explain endogenously the formation of collateral prices. This is the lacuna that the present section has tried to fill. A model is developed which explains simultaneously the determination of interest rates and collateral prices-in other words, explicit and implicit interest rates. It shows, further, that collateral will indeed be underpriced, thereby providing a theoretical counterpart to what had earlier been observed empirically.
The first step in constructing such a model is to recognise that a person's demand for loans depends not on the explicit interest charge, i, alone, but also on the price of collateral, p-the lower the p, the lower being the demand. Taking this into account, the landlord chooses (i,p) so as to maximise his earnings. For analytical simplicity, this optimal (i,p) is characterised in two steps. First, it was assumed that i is exogenously fixed, and we focused exclusively on the process of determination of the collateral price. This provides a dual to traditional theory which has been concerned solely with the formation of i. From this the generalised model is an easy second step. This model provides many new insights into the process of rural usury. It should also be possible to derive from it propositions in comparative statics, though that is a direction that I have not pursued here.
E xten sion s and r ela ted issu es
Uncertainty and repayment capacity
The above model has been constructed without bringing uncertainty directly into the picture. But many of the features of the model have been chosen so as to acknowledge the important role of uncertainty. For example, it is not clear why in this model and the other earlier ones the borrower and the lender go through the exercise of having an interest rate and a contingent default agreement. Since they both know what the final outcome will be, why can they not simply agree that 'this is the loan and this will be repaid in terms of this much money and this much land'? Why go through the charade of having a collateral price and an agreement saying that depending on how much is defaulted, collateral will have to be transferred using the collateral price as the conversion rate? The reason, in reality, must be because each believes that he can do better by having a contingent agreement rather than one with the exact form and amounts o f repayment specified. This could be explained by introducing uncertainty or an assumption of asymmetric information about K. While it is desirable to construct a theory which includes these features in its ambit, the present limited approach is, however, not methodologically flawed. Once we know why complicated contracts exist, we can analyse them in a certainty model in the same way that we analyse the effects of price-taking behaviour in the Edgeworth box because we know that if there were many agents, they would be price-takers, ever, though in the Edgeworth box there are only two.
Similarly, one of the factors which make the implicit and explicit interest rates distinct concepts is uncertainty. In this case, however, even in the absence of uncertainty these concepts would be separate. The reason is quite interesting. Because of the absence of a proper market for collateral, the borrower and the lender value the collateral differently. This means that a change in p is evaluated differently by the two agents (excepting in the
